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other thing. Their thoughts are mostly confined to the needs of the body; and it is reasonable that pure and spotless thoughts be the reward of cares more noble. It is true that children and savages have the mind less altered by customs, but they also have it nurtured by the teaching, which gives attention. It would be an inappropriate endowment that the brightest lights should better shine in the mind of those who less deserve them, and who are enveloped in thick clouds. I would not have you, then, glory too much in ignorance and barbarism, since you are as learned and as clever as you are, Philaethes, as well as your excellent author; that would be lowering the gifts of God. Some one will say that the more ignorant you are the more you approach the advantage of a block of marble or of a piece of wood, which are infallible and sinless. But, unfortunately, it is not by ignorance that you approach this advantage; and, as far as you are capable of knowledge, you sin in neglecting to acquire it, and you will err so much the more easily the less information you possess.

GOESCHEL ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF CARL FRIEDRICH GOESCHEL, BY SUSAN E. BLOW.

CHAPTER III—(*Continued*).

The Triplicity of the Proofs of Immortality in the Light of Speculation.

We have seen how the current proofs of immortality are reflected and transfigured in the light of speculation. The most significant feature of our investigation, however, is that we have found the threads of this development in the very system which seems most antagonistic to personal immortality. That Spinoza himself has forged for us the arms with which we combat pantheism is overwhelming testimony to the inextirpability of the concept of persistence.

It is also remarkable that while Leibnitz, like Epicurus, moves from atoms as his starting-point, he reaches a result diametrically opposed to that of the ancient philosopher in that he proves per-

sonal immortality from the indivisible internality of the Monad. Not less noteworthy is it that in the system of Leibnitz the three proofs develop out of and successively to each other. Leading first from the compound to the simple, Leibnitz begins the development of his system with the content of the first proof; he then leads us through the varied orders and series of monads to the rational Monad, and finally to the divine primitive Monad, in which all things live and move and have their being (the kernel of the second proof), wherefore throughout creation nothing can perish (and here we reach the third proof). Immediately there is attributed to each Monad certa quaedam *αὐτάρκεια*; then it is recognized that originally this autarky belongs only to the primitive Monad, and created monads exist as continual divinitatis fulgurationes, and are preserved through continuous creation. The consequence is that nothing perishes. Nequeunt monades interire nisi per annihilationem. But such annihilation would be annihilation of the divine will, and thus we reach the final result, viz., quodlibet animal, quamvis machina ipsius saepius ex parte pereat, animaue involucra organica vetera relinquat, vel nova capiat, esse indestructibile. It may be added that the Monad theory of Leibnitz which moves through the complete cycle of the proofs of immortality has recently taken on flesh and bone and appeared in concrete poetic form in the Conversations of Goethe with Falk.

An evident result of our investigation up to this point is that, on the one hand, the first proof of immortality, commonly called the metaphysical proof, is the basis of all the subsequent proofs, and that on the other it requires these subsequent proofs for its own development and completion. It is clear also that within its own sphere the content of the first proof has two apparently antagonistic sides. The one is that the soul as immaterial is exhibited in independence and separability from its external body, and is thus withdrawn from the power of death. But this very independence of a visible external and tangible body presupposes in the soul a separating and self-limiting moment, and this moment is the body which the soul has in itself. The second phase of the first proof is, therefore, that immanent unity and inseparability of the soul and the body which is indispensable if the soul after separation from its external body is to persist in its indi-

vidual form. The soul must be different from its external body, but indissolubly one with its internal body if after death it is to preserve its individuality and substantiality. When Philo, essaying to demonstrate immortality, rests the whole weight of his argument upon the separability of the reasonable God-conscious soul from the body which fetters and clogs it, he necessarily presupposes in the soul an immanent organ, and implies the inseparability of the soul from its inmost bond. The second moment leads immediately to immortality; the first mediately through its content to resurrection, which in its first phase is concerned with that external body which has been given over to death. The death of the body is nothing more than the continuance of the *dissectio membrorum*, the sensible completion of that schism in which the whole creation travails and groans. We may see also in the philosophy of Philo how the content of the first proof leads over to the second. He claims immortality only for the *ψυχὴ λογικῇ, διανοητικῇ*, because this is divine, and as divine free. The source of this divinity and freedom is the spirit of God breathed by God into man, whom he thus created in his own image. Therefore the destiny of man is to behold God. So, too, teaches Plotinus. According to this insight, on the one hand the separation of the soul from the body develops to reunion of soul and body by means of the resurrection; and, on the other hand, the indivisible Being-for-self or individuality of the soul in its internal body, in that it wakes and ascends into consciousness, leads in its progressive course to communion with God, and consequently to that personality of the spirit without which communion is unthinkable, and the vision of God, remaining external, contradicts itself.

As we trace the progressive movement of proof through its various phases, it is most important that we seize definitely and clearly its physiological aspect and significance. The development of the soul is essentially physiological; it is constituted, in fact, by the relationship of the soul to the body. The soul does not abstractly develop itself, but it develops, transforms, and penetrates its body and its relationship to the body. For this reason, the crown of physiological development is personality. We recognize the physiological principle in the second phase of the first proof which is the first mark of the advancing movement; the physiological principle emerges simultaneously with

the corporeality of the soul. Most significant in this connection is the procedure of the school of Wolf, which, in the sphere of the metaphysical proof, does not rest in an abstract and formal unity, but, moving forward at once to the corporeality of the soul, grounds the persistence of self-consciousness primarily in the soul's physiological development. The abstract simplicity of the soul is, of course, the starting-point. *Anima est ens simplex*: from this follows the incorruptibility of the soul. This incorruptibility of the soul is, however, no voucher for the persistence of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness rests upon the union of the soul with its inborn body; this inborn body Wolf indicates by a special word in order to distinguish it from the external body, which is merely its palpable manifestation, and he apprehends the soul in its marriage with this inborn body as person. The presupposition of this union is the creation which renews itself in each generation and birth, and accompanies each freshly begotten soul throughout life and beyond death; the incarnation of the soul is an act of creation, in whose uninterrupted continuance consists the physiological process. Immediately, *ex sua natura*, in virtue of its simplicity, the soul is imperishable; but its indissoluble union with its body follows, not from its nature, but from the concept of creation or from the nature of God, who must so perpetuate the soul as he has created the soul. The death of the body must therefore not be apprehended as the disembodying of the soul. The soul does not become bodiless when it leaves the body soulless. As consciousness rests upon the union of the soul with its organ, the body, the persistence of consciousness, or, more definitely, reminiscence (*recordatio*), may now be physiologically explained. Death is followed by ever deeper inter-penetration of body and soul; the result of this conformably with self-revealing physiological laws is that reminiscence, together with all its representations and images, grows ever clearer, more definite, and more luminous. Thus, in virtue of its perfectibility, the soul mounts from light to light. Herewith we are already in the sphere of the second proof, which completes itself in the third through the concept of personality.

The physiological principle of the process of proof moves from the connection of the psychic and somatic moments which conditions consciousness and culminates with the unity of these mo-

ments in the concept of personality. The phases of the movement are, first, pre-existence; or, better, still, essence; second, creation and generation, through which the divine and the human, the infinite and the finite, merge in one; third, perfectibility, which, and that too in the form of consciousness, is an indispensable stipulation of the union between the infinite and finite. Adequately apprehended, this perfectibility is the development of the created spirit through which it becomes what it is created to be. In this power of development is, however, necessarily included the possibility of lapse. The soul must develop itself by its own activity into the image of God; yet it can do this only by constantly drawing freely power from God. Obviously, in the course of its self-development, it may tear itself away from God and may persist in this fallen state of subjective isolation until divine power condescends to a second act of creative grace. The culmination is always personality, by means of which perfectibility completes itself without ceasing to be, and finds peace without sinking into sleep. With reference to these representations and conceptions, we have already referred to Dante, "*Purgatorio*," xviii, 49; xxv, 37.

In our own day the validity of this physiological consideration has been profoundly discussed on many sides. Finally Schubert has gone straight to the kernel of the whole matter and given us a history of the soul replete with suggestive reflections and profound insights. From the surface of appearance he finds a path into the hidden depths of existence; from abstract, colorless light he leads us into night and mystery, into the very essence of Being. Through the profound darkness Faith, with her torch, leads the way, and we emerge at last out of night into the morning, where the truth we have wrested from the gloom reflects itself in a thousand shining forms. Night is the mother of light, the body of translucent color. Without descending into the darkness we can never mount to the light. What is still necessary is that the rich material which Schubert has accumulated should be inwardly digested; that with a deeper plunge into the hidden world of miracles we may find a fairer morning and gaze with clearer eyes while the crimson glow of the sunrise grows into the perfect day.

We have already indicated how the triplicity of the proofs of

immortality is repeated and transfigured in the immanent development of the concept of the soul. This triplicity rests, first, upon the simplicity of the soul; second, upon its infinity; third, upon thought. So, in the development of the concept, the soul reveals itself first as individual, or the one in opposition to its other; second, as consciousness of itself and of its other; hence, consciousness of God; third, as spirit in its personality—*i. e.*, in the identity or mediation of self with its other *in* the individual.

This triplicity develops of itself from the position in which we find the soul. This position is the middle point between two extremes. As we find the soul, the soul already is; what the soul has been, lies, as essence, behind it; what the soul shall be, lies, as actuality, before it.

The question of the immortality of the soul is therefore immediately a question asked by the present of the future. Therefore in our investigation we first essayed to follow the forward movement of the soul toward its culmination in the finite spirit, starting with it from that middle point of time in which it is placed. And as the present asked the question, so in the present we found its answer; the present answered instead of the future by becoming itself the future it questioned. Upon this procedure rests in its final ground the so-called metaphysical proof of the personal persistence of the soul, for this proof seizes the soul in its immediacy and seeks for it in the future what it lacks in the present. A parallel to this process is found in the cosmological proof of the existence of God, which, seizing the world in its immediacy, seeks what it lacks in the highest essence. The nature of the world is to seek that which fulfils and explains it—that without which it is nothing. *The first longing aspiration after God seeks him in the future*, because it has not found him *now*, because it misses him *here*.

The path of the soul out of the present into the future is scarcely trodden ere it points from the future into the past, which is the background and ultimate presupposition of the soul. Thus, in its second phase, the question of immortality is addressed by the present to the past; the essential basis of the present and future is sought in what has been. Thus, the finite spirit, which was the actualization and unveiling of the soul, pointed us back to that Absolute Spirit which was prior to the finite spirit and as Abso-

lute ever is and shall be. In the Absolute Spirit we found the origin or essence of the pre-existent internality of the soul, which, by means of externalization or existence, passes over to the future of the soul in God. The same path from the present into the past and through the past into the future may be detected in the moral proof of immortality, for this leads from the nature of the soul as determined to the determining essence, which is both the presupposition of the soul's existence and the guarantee of the soul's immortality. We find in the finite spirit power over all the dimensions of time. Memory guards the content of the past. Reminiscence makes this past content present. In reminiscence Plato finds the pledge of that self-conscious future to which it bears a content. Whence comes reminiscence unless from the Essence which has been? To what end is reminiscence given if not for the time which shall be? Similarly the physico-theological proof of the existence of God leads not only from the conditioned to the prior unconditioned, but also from the contingent existence of the world to the essential nature of the world, and from this to its aboriginal determining principle. Thus, originating in reflection upon the nature of the world, the search for God in its second phase *looks for him in the past as the Absolute First*.

But the question with regard to the persistence of the human soul grows keener and more pressing in its forward movement. If in its importunity it turned first from the present to the future, or to that post-existence with which it was immediately concerned; if, next, it addressed the future mediately through the past, without which as essence it could have neither completion nor fulfilment, it turns finally to the totality of time, which is the mediation of the present; to the unity of the three dimensions of time penetrated by the concept of Spirit, *sub specie aeternitatis*; to the outcome of time, which reveals itself as eternity. It was thus that in our investigation of the soul's development we attained ultimately the concept of Absolute Personality, which, penetrating all time, was, is, and shall be, and from this insight pressed on to the nature of conditioned personality, which, according to its essence, includes in itself with the present both the future and the past. Crudely parallel with this movement was the process of the third proof of immortality, which found in Thought itself the pledge of its persistence, because it includes in the present all the

dimensions of time. So, too, the ontological proof of the existence of God found the existence of the Perfect Being included in the concept of the Perfect Being. Perfection implies that nothing is lacking—that all moments of the Totality are simultaneously present—hence eternity. The present is only complete when it includes the past and the future. “Where life feels the joy of living, the past endures, the future hastens, and the moment is eternity.”

The spirit is immortal because it is eternal, and it is eternal because it has the form of infinitude. Its so-called future is only the concrete realization of its infinite form. Just as the essence, *οὐσία*, was and is now *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*, so is it also present as future: the first is also the last, *τέλος*. The infinite first attains its truth and actuality through the fact that it is complete or totality, and has done with further growth. As complete it is not only past, but also present. Entelechy, or perfection, is essentially entelechy, or persistence. This is the outcome of all demonstration.

The immortality of the soul must therefore not be conceived as something which shall be hereafter; it is the present quality of the soul. The spirit is eternal, therefore present; the spirit is present, therefore already eternal. This inherent eternity of the spirit in its first phase is the Individuality of the soul; its second phase is the unrealized ideal, which emerges from the discord of consciousness—*i. e.*, that the spirit should not remain in its first state of nature, but should become what by its essential nature it is destined to be; in the third phase it realizes its own image and becomes like unto itself. It is evident that the first of these phases corresponds to the metaphysical proof, the second to the moral proof, the third to the ontological proof, the concept of the spirit itself, which is mediated only through Personality.

It has therefore been said with truth that the determinations of time, through whose epochs moves the process of the soul's development, are themselves only the moments of the spirit which in its self-generation perpetuates its identity with itself through the unity of its content with its form. With this insight the triplicity of development receives additional confirmation.

In accordance with this attained result of our investigation, the immortality of the soul is grasped as the outcome and actuality of the soul, and the future as the concrete present. This outcome

develops itself first out of the being of the individual; second, out of the essence of the Subject; finally, out of thought itself, which alone is real, and as spirit is personality.

In its ultimate analysis the whole process of proof rests upon the three words: *Cogito, ergo sum*. The content of this statement is, however, developed through its various stages; the present tense of Being made fruitful by Thought has its development in itself. The first and obvious meaning of the statement is this: the soul thinks, therefore it is simple, and as simple it is unchangeable—the same to-morrow as to-day. Its deeper meaning is diremption; the soul thinks, therefore it is infinite; it thinks itself and that which is other than itself, hence God; the soul thinks and is thought—it is thought by the thinking subject as subject. *Cogito, ergo cogitor; cogitor, ergo sum*. The soul *is*, and the object of the soul *is*; both think and both are thought. The ultimate meaning is thought itself, which includes being; the reasonable is the actual; spirit is of and for the spirit.

It may be mentioned here that in dogmatic philosophy not only the existence, but also the essential nature of God is sought and indicated in three different ways. These ways are known as *via negationis*, *causalitatis*, and *eminentiae*. There are implicit in them essentially the same categories which we have discovered in the proofs of the existence of God and of the actuality of the Soul. We find them also as Reality, Negation, and Limitation in the Kantian Table of categories under the head of Quality. The parallelism of these methods of ascent toward the nature of God with the theological proofs of existence and the psychological proofs of immortality needs only to be indicated.

In the cosmological proof, by the method of negation is deduced, from what the world is not and has not in itself, an existence outside of the world. The teleological proof, like the argument from Causality, deduces the presupposition of the world from the nature of the world. Finally, the ontological proof in accord with the method *eminentiae* infers the reality of perfection from its concept.

The same correspondence may be traced in the psychological sphere. Analogically with the method of negation the metaphysical proof ascribes to the soul the future it lacks, deducing the reality of this future out of what the soul as yet is not but in ac-

cordance with the concept of simplicity should be. Moreover, we are really led to this simplicity or immateriality of the soul itself by the path of negation, for we find the soul immediately immersed in matter, and we reason from the contradiction between this condition of the soul and its essential nature to its immateriality, inferring its internality from its externality and deducing the imperishability of the internal from the transience of the external. The moral proof, on the contrary, infers from the potentiality of the soul its realization, and therein accords with the method of causality which, from what is, reasons backward to a cause corresponding to the effect, and forward to a goal corresponding to origin and development. Out of this twofoldness of the law of Causality is developed the double form of the moral proof which, as we have seen, leads from existence backward to pre-existence or the essence before existence, and forward to post-existence or the Actuality after existence. The *ὁθεν* lies as Origin behind; the *οὐ ἔνεκα*, as goal before; but as the Good both are one. Finally, the ontological proof of immortality develops by the path of "Eminence"; the eminence of being is being in all its dimensions; the outcome of this pregnant being is thought. Thought is the Alpha and Omega of Being.

From these remarks it is clear that all these varied forms of proof differ in their content only because they develop separately the existence and the nature of God, and similarly seek the immortality of the soul as distinct from the nature of the soul. According to this content must be determined the relationship of the varied forms of proof. Being and Essence are so related that only in the unity of both can be found the truth of each.

Before continuing the development of our subject it may be well to mention a construction of the soul which proceeds from the critical philosophy, and which merits the greater consideration, because it not only unconsciously includes the three dogmatic spheres of proof, but also from the present standpoint of philosophy finds its justification in the immanent development of the soul. This construction attributes to the soul, without detriment to its unity, two distinct elements; these elements are defined as expansive and attractive force, as relationship to the object and to the subject, more briefly still as impulse and sense. The unity of these two elements is the truth of both. They are real and active

only in their synthesis or dynamic unity. Out of their relationship are developed, according to the category of quantity, the three principal powers of the soul: Representation, in which the preponderating element is sense; as Appetite, wherein the balance inclines to the side of outward impulse; and Feeling, wherein neither element outweighs the other. From this same relationship are developed, according to the category of quality, the three different stages of unfolding upon which rests the perfectibility of the human soul.

The first stage is the period of Individuality or sense, which is followed by the period of Understanding, to which succeeds the period of Reason. The object of the first period is the sensible; the object of the last period is the supersensible or infinite; the middle period oscillates between the two. Omitting much interesting detail which belongs to this peculiar standpoint, we recognize in its outline, first, the unity of the different determinations of the soul, or simplicity, apprehended as the unity of the internal and the external, of the soul and its immanent body; second, the diremption of this unity, recognized quantitatively in the outwardly directed Appetite, and qualitatively in the Understanding, which vibrates between the internal and the external, and, while separating, seeks to unite them; third, mediated unity apprehended quantitatively in Feeling, which is seized not as the neutralization, but as the equalization of the two elements, and qualitatively in Reason, to which belongs Will as distinguished from Appetite. Reason, in distinction from Individuality, is grasped as Universality. Universality is literally the unity mediated through the circular development of the Concept or Notion. We have already recognized the truth of this Universality as Personality, just as the truth of sensuousness is Individuality, and the truth of Understanding the duplex nature of Consciousness.

From the standpoint of this ingenious conception of the nature and activity of the soul it may be said that the first or theoretical proof relates to the soul in its narrowest sense, the second or practical proof to the body, also in its narrowest sense, while the third, or ontological proof, includes body and soul, being and thought, the *ὄν* and the *λόγος*. The object of the first proof is the simple, internal, the essential—the intensive being of force as feeling; the object of the second proof is the expansion of force,

the impulse outward. The first proof is theoretical because it apprehends its object according to its nature; the second proof is practical because its attention is directed to the body of its object, or, in other words, to its active manifestation. As externalization, the body is essentially the practical direction of the soul, the deed of thought, as the soul is the thought of thought. In the light of speculative philosophy, soul and body are revealed as the moments of the spirit, neither of which is independent of the other. The soul, as internal, is the calm, in itself inactive centre; the body, as externalization of this internality, is activity. This insight confirms the validity of the former as the theoretical, and of the latter as the practical moment. The soul is the calm, contemplative ruling moment; the body the active, effective, serving moment. Neither is independent of the other, for creation, as the active corporeality of the Supreme Principle, itself participates in this principle.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

ANALYSIS OF GOETHE'S "ELECTIVE AFFINITIES."

[We reprint the following remarkable article on Goethe's "Elective Affinities" from "The Index" of June 12, 1879.—Ed.]

The central idea of the "Elective Affinities" is the sanctity of the marriage relation. "What God or Fate hath joined together, let no man put asunder"—is the lesson to be learned in this most moral of moral tales. With a skilful hand Goethe has laid bare the inmost recesses of the human heart, held up to view its loves, its passions, and its weakness, and shown too its superhuman strength, its firmness, and its nobility. He brings before us a couple, happy in their relation to each other as husband and wife. No strong, passionate sentiment binds them together; their tastes are similar, their friendship sincere; and this friendship and similarity of tastes they mistake for conjugal love. Meanwhile Charlotte, the prudent, discreet wife, all unconsciously finds herself in love with and